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“Every day, we live with the very real possibility that, 
despite following every law and every policy of the 
United States, Tim will be forced to leave the country, 
and I will be left without my caretaker and the love of 
my life.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Independently, immigration and same-sex marriage are con-
tentious issues in the United States.  However, the effect these issues 
have on each other is seldom considered in mainstream debates over 
either issue.  The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)2 imposes 
numerical quotas on the number of aliens3 permitted to immigrate in-
to the United States.4  Immigrant visas are allocated in accordance 
with a preference system, which limits eligibility to categories estab-
 
* Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. 2011; Southern Connecticut State 
University, B.S. 2002 in Communications; Hunter College, Master of Urban Affairs 2005.  I 
want to start by thanking God for all of the blessings that He or She has bestowed upon me.  
I would like to thank my wife and son, Lisa and Aiden Rivers, my parents, Jesse and Gloria 
Rivers, and my in-laws, Dario and Estella Benitez, for all of their love and support.  I would 
also like to thank Professor Douglas Scherer for being an excellent advisor for this project, 
and throughout my law school career.  Last, but not least, I want to thank all of my unmen-
tioned family members, friends, and colleagues for their support and encouragement. 
1 Immigration Equality Hails Government Decision Allowing Lesbian and Gay Couples to 
File Green Card Applications, NEWSRX, Apr. 15, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 27684571 
(discussing United States citizen Edwin Blesch’s concern over the potential deportation of 
his husband and South African national, Tim Smulian). 
2 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2011). 
3 Milestones: 1945-1952, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-
1952/ImmigrationAct (last visited May 2, 2013); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (“The term ‘alien’ 
means any person not a citizen or national of the United States.”). 
4 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(1)-(3) (2011). 
1
Rivers: Same-Sex Couples in America
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013
904 TOURO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
lished by the INA.5  However, aliens who are “immediate relatives” 
of United States citizens are exempt from the numerical quotas.6  
Spouses, children, and parents are considered “immediate relatives.”7 
Section 1101(b) of the INA defines the terms contained in ti-
tle II of the Act, which provides for the immigration of immediate 
relatives of United States citizens into the United States.8  While the 
terms “child” and “parent” are defined with great detail, the Act is si-
lent on how the term “spouse” should be defined.9  Consequently, 
courts have been forced to interpret the Congressional intent of the 
statute when determining whether people who are partners in legal 
same-sex marriages fall within the definition of the term spouse. 
In Adams v. Howerton,10 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that “Congress intended that only partners in heterosexual mar-
riages be considered spouses under [the INA].”11  Though Adams was 
decided in 1982, it remains binding authority in the Ninth Circuit, 
and continues to be persuasive authority in other jurisdictions.  As a 
consequence of the view adopted by the Ninth Circuit, countless fam-
ilies have been forced to make the painful choice to either be perma-
nently separated from their loved ones or depart from their homeland 
for a more accepting society.12  Part II of this Article discusses why 
Adams was erroneously decided in 1982 and why it should be over-
ruled today. 
Parts III, IV, V, VI, and VII discuss the Defense of Marriage 
Act (“DOMA”),13 its past effect on bi-national same-sex couples, and 
the reasons it is unconstitutional.  Additionally, Part VIII discusses 
current challenges to DOMA, and its impact on bi-national same-sex 
 
5 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2011). 
6 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2011). 
7 Id. 
8 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) (2011). 
9 See 8 U.S.C.  § 1101(b)(1)-(2) (2011) (defining the terms child and parent, but failing to 
define the term spouse). 
10 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982). 
11 Id. at 1041. 
12 Congressional Documents, Leahy Introduces Bill to Bring Equality to Lawful Partners 
in Immigration Law, FED. INFO. & NEWS DISPATCH, INC., Apr. 14, 2011, available at 2011 
WLNR 7322481 (noting that at least twenty-five nations offer immigration benefits to same-
sex couples, including Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greenland, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, The 
Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, and the United Kingdom) [hereinafter Congressional Documents]. 
13 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
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couples.  Part IX discusses the proposed Uniting American Families 
Act (“UAFA”)14 as a possible solution to these challenges.  Finally, 
Part X is the conclusion of this Article. 
II.  ADAMS V. HOWERTON 
In Adams v. Howerton,15 United States citizen Richard Adams 
and his husband, Australian citizen Anthony Sullivan, appealed the 
decision of the Central California District Court, which held that 
“two persons of the same sex . . . will not be thought of as being 
‘spouses’ to each other within the meaning of the immigration 
laws.”16  Adams and Sullivan were married in a ceremony performed 
by a minister in Colorado after securing a marriage license from the 
County Clerk in Boulder, Colorado.17  Subsequently, Adams filed a 
petition with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) to 
have Sullivan classified as his immediate relative, which was admin-
istratively denied.18 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit applied a two-step analysis to de-
termine when a person is a spouse for purposes of the INA.19  The 
first step is to determine “whether the marriage is valid under state 
law”; the second step is to determine “whether [the] state-approved 
marriage qualifies under the [INA].”20  The court determined that it 
was unclear whether same-sex marriages were permitted under Colo-
rado law and decided the matter based solely on the second step of 
the analysis.21  In light of the fact that the term spouse is not defined 
in the INA, the court analyzed various factors to ascertain the Con-
gressional intent of excluding immediate relatives from the INA quo-
ta limitations.22  The court’s rationale for affirming the district court 
was that: (1) substantial deference should be given to the INS’s inter-
pretation of the statute;23 (2) the “ordinary, contemporary, [and] 
 
14 See H.R. 1537, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposing amendments to the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act to accommodate same-sex partners). 
15 486 F. Supp 1119 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff’d, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982). 
16 Id. at 1125. 
17 Id. at 1120. 
18 Id. at 1120-21. 
19 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1038. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 1039. 
22 Id. at 1038-39. 
23 Id. at 1040. 
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common meaning” of spouse should be applied;24 and (3) other pro-
visions of the INA should be analyzed to determine whether the term 
“spouse” was intended to include same-sex marriages because the 
statute should be considered as a whole.25 
The court stated that “unless there are compelling indications 
that it is wrong,” substantial deference should be given to the INS’s 
construction of who constitutes a spouse within the meaning of the 
INA.26  However, according to the Administrative Procedure Act 
(“APA”), “[t]he reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with the law.”27  The INS’s main contention was that “one cannot be 
married to a person of the same sex and thus, if they are of the same 
sex, one may not be a spouse to the other.”28  In addition, the INS ar-
gued that this was applicable under Colorado and federal law.29 
However, as stated by the Ninth Circuit on appeal, it was un-
clear whether same-sex marriage was permissible under Colorado 
law.30  Additionally, there was no federal law at the time that prohib-
ited the recognition of same-sex marriages.31  The INS’s proffered 
reason for denying Adam’s petition for Sullivan is clearly arbitrary 
and an abuse of discretion.32  The INS premised the denial of the peti-
tion on fictional state and federal laws.33  Furthermore, the INS ig-
nored the fact that the marriage license was issued by a state offi-
cial.34  Instead, it unilaterally determined that same-sex marriage was 
impermissible under Colorado and federal law.35  Therefore, the 
INS’s finding was arbitrary and an abuse of the discretion that Con-
 
24 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. (quoting N.Y. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973)). 
27 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2011); see also I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445 
n.29 (1987); Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984). 
28 Adams, 486 F. Supp at 1121. 
29 Id. 
30 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1039. 
31 Id. at 1039-40. 
32 See Bastidas v. I.N.S, 609 F.2d 101, 106 (3rd Cir. 1979) (vacating and remanding the 
case back to the Board of Immigration Appeals because of a misapplication of applicable 
case law). 
33 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1039-40. 
34 Id. at 1038. 
35 Id. at 1040. 
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gress bestowed upon it to enforce the INA.36 
The Ninth Circuit stated that “[t]he term ‘marriage’ ordinarily 
contemplates a relationship between a man and a woman.  The term 
‘spouse’ commonly refers to one of the parties in a marital relation-
ship . . . .”37  The court concluded that it would be inappropriate to 
enlarge the ordinary meaning of the words without evidence of Con-
gressional intent to do so.38  This “argument did little more than state 
a conclusion [that] lesbians and gay men cannot be spouses because 
the law does not recognize [homosexual] relationships.”39  Without 
explicitly stating it, the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit gave substan-
tial weight to the biases of the majority.  However, even though this 
reasoning makes the court’s job easier, such reasoning is impermissi-
ble.  As stated by Chief Justice Burger two years after Adams was de-
cided, “Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the 
law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”40  If court deci-
sions were at the mercy of private biases or popular opinion, states 
would still be permitted to enact such legislation as anti-
miscegenation statutes.41  Moreover, it would still be permissible for 
custody disputes to be decided solely based on the race of the parties 
involved.42  The court’s decision to defer to the colloquial “common 
meaning” of the word “spouse” made its members appear as mere lay 
persons making speculations about the law, as opposed to constitu-
tional experts upholding their duty as members of the United States 
Court of Appeals.43 
The Ninth Circuit reviewed other sections of the INA to de-
termine whether Congress intended the term spouse to include indi-
 
36 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012). 
37 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040 (internal quotations omitted). 
38 Id. 
39 Cynthia M. Reed, Note, When Love, Comity, and Justice Conquer Borders: INS Recog-
nition of Same-Sex Marriage, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 97, 103 (1996). 
40 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). 
41 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967).  “The Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires that the freedom of choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discrimina-
tions.  Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not to marry, a person of another race 
resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”  Id. at 12. 
42 See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 434 (“The effects of racial prejudice, however real, cannot 
justify a racial classification removing an infant child from the custody of its natural mother 
found to be an appropriate person to have such custody.”). 
43 Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040 (quoting Perrin, 444 U.S. at 42 (1979) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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viduals in same-sex marriages.44  In doing so, the court found that the 
1965 amendments to the INA rendered homosexuals excludable un-
der section 212,45 and concluded that it was “unlikely that Congress 
intended to give homosexual spouses preferential admission treat-
ment under section 201(b) of the Act when, in the very same amend-
ments adding that section, it mandated their exclusion.  . . . [W]e can 
only conclude that Congress intended that only partners in heterosex-
ual marriages be considered spouses . . . .”46  Ironically, this conclu-
sion is flawed despite its viable appearance. 
The Ninth Circuit erred in its review of the Act in a number of 
ways.  The court failed to thoroughly review the Act, the basis of the 
amendment to the Act, or the subsequent changes in medical views 
since the 1965 Amendment took effect.  Prior to the 1965 amend-
ment, the 1952 amendment provided that “all suspected homosexuals 
attempting to enter into the U.S. were to endure an evaluation by the 
Public Health Service (PHS).”47  The 1952 amendment did not ex-
pressly exclude homosexuals, but it did exclude individuals with a 
psychopathic disorder or a mental defect.48  If PHS diagnosed the in-
dividual seeking admission with a psychopathic, personality, or other 
condition, it issued a certificate, which “constituted the sole evidence 
for exclusion or deportation of the foreign national.”49  Certificates 
were routinely issued for people found to be homosexuals because 
homosexuality was “classified as a psychological ailment in the Sta-
tistical and Diagnostic Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).”50 
In Fleuti v. Rosenberg,51 the Ninth Circuit held that the term 
“psychopathic personality” was too vague to exclude homosexuals 
because it failed to give “sufficiently definite warning” that homo-
sexuality actually fell into the definition of this term.52  Reacting to 




46 Id. at 1040-41. 
47 Dennis A. Golden, The Policy Considerations Surrounding the United States’ Immigra-
tion Law as Applied to Bi-National Same-Sex Couples: Making the Case for the Uniting 
American Families Act, 18-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 302 (2009). 
48 Id. 
49 Lena Ayoub & Shin-Ming Wong, Separated and Unequal, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
559, 564 (2006). 
50 Golden, supra note 47, at 302. 
51 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962). 
52 Id. at 658. 
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exhibited “sexual deviation” in 1965.53  Additionally, in 1967, the 
United States Supreme Court held that “Congress used the phrase 
‘psychopathic personality’ not in the clinical sense, but to effectuate 
its purpose to exclude entry from all homosexuals and other sex per-
verts.”54 
The paradigm shift began to occur in 1973 when the Ameri-
can Psychiatric Association determined that homosexuality was not a 
clinical disorder and eliminated it from DSM-II.55  Consequently, in 
1979, PHS announced that it would no longer issue certificates solely 
on the basis on one’s homosexuality.56  Ironically, the Department of 
Justice opined that it would continue to exclude self-proclaimed ho-
mosexuals due to Congress’s addition of the term “sexual deviation” 
to the statute.57 
If the Adams court would have properly analyzed the Act, it 
would have realized that the exclusion of homosexuals was largely 
based on the belief that homosexuality was a mental disorder, which 
was manifested through sexually deviant behavior.  In addition, the 
court would have been cognizant that Congress’s intent was to ex-
clude all aliens with mental disorders, not only homosexuals.58  
Should the court have viewed the statute in light of the American 
Psychiatric Association’s determination that homosexuality was not a 
clinical disorder, the court would have recognized that the congres-
sional intentions of the 1965 Amendment were, in fact, moot. 
Additionally, if the court acknowledged Congress’s belief—
that homosexuality was a mental disorder as opposed to an exercise 
of moral and social deviance—it would have analyzed section 212 of 
the INA in greater detail.  As a result, the court would have discov-
ered that waivers were available which permitted persons with mental 
 
53 Golden, supra note 47, at 302-03 (quoting Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 
15(b) (1990) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (2002))) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
54 Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 122 (1967). 
55 Golden, supra note 47, at 303. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
58 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I)-(II) (2011) (stating in relevant part that “[a]ny al-
ien . . . who is determined (in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services in consultation with the Attorney General)—(I) to have a physi-
cal or mental disorder and behavior associated with the disorder that may pose, or has posed, 
a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the alien or others, or (II) to have had a physical 
or mental disorder and a history of behavior associated with the disorder, which behavior has 
posed a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the alien or others and which behavior is 
likely to recur or to lead to other harmful behavior . . . .”). 
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disorders to enter the United States.59  As Cynthia Reed pointed out, 
the court “expressly failed to analyze discretionary waivers as evi-
dence of Congress’s intent to allow the Attorney General to resolve 
conflicts within the Act.”60  The Ninth Circuit’s failure to carefully 
analyze the statute caused it to overlook the reasons why Congress 
intended to exclude homosexuals, and whether the basis of the exclu-
sion was applicable in determining how Congress intended for the 
term “spouse” to be defined in INA section 201(b). 
III.  DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT’S EFFECT ON BI-NATIONAL 
SAME-SEX COUPLES 
The rationale for the holding in Adams lost validity when 
Congress enacted the Immigration Reform Act of 1990, which elimi-
nated the statutory ground for exclusion based on “sexual devian-
cy.”61  This gave bi-national same-sex couples new hope.  However, 
this hope was diminished when President William Jefferson Clinton62 
signed the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) into law.63  In ac-
cordance with DOMA, the federal government would only recognize 
marriages entered into between one man and one woman.64  This leg-
islation was unprecedented because this marked the first time the fed-
eral government prescribed a definition for marriage.65  With the ex-
ception of the Supreme Court’s decision holding that anti-
 
59 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g) (stating in relevant part that “[t]he Attorney General may waive the 
application of . . . any alien who (A) is the spouse or the unmarried son or daughter, or the 
minor unmarried lawfully adopted child, of a United States citizen, or of an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence, or of an alien who has been issued an immigrant visa, (B) 
has a son or daughter who is a United States citizen, or an alien lawfully admitted for perma-
nent residence, or an alien who has been issued an immigrant visa; or (C) is a VAWA self-
petitioner, in accordance with such terms, conditions, and controls, if any . . . .”). 
60 Reed, supra note 39, at 105; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g)(3) (“[T]he Attorney General, 
in the discretion of the Attorney General after consultation with the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services, may by regulation prescribe.”). 
61 Golden, supra note 47, at 304; see also Yepes-Prado v. U.S. I.N.S., 10 F.3d 1363, 1369 
n.12 (9th Cir. 1993) (“In addition to stressing its views regarding ‘privacy and personal dig-
nity,’ the House Report for the Reform Act stated that the amendments demonstrate ‘that the 
United States does not view personal decisions about sexual orientation as a danger to other 
people in our society.’ ”) (citation omitted). 
62 William J. Clinton, THE WHITE HOUSE,, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/ 
williamjclinton (last visited May 2, 2013).  William Jefferson Clinton, Democrat, was the 
forty-second President of the United States.  Id. 
63 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
64 Golden, supra note 47, at 304. 
65 Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 392 (D. Mass. 2010). 
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miscegenation statutes are unconstitutional, the task of defining mar-
riage was generally left to the states.66 
DOMA was Congress’s reaction to the Hawaii Supreme 
Court’s decision in Baehr v. Lewin,67 which held that it was unlawful 
sex-based discrimination for Hawaii to refuse to grant same-sex cou-
ples marriage licenses under the Hawaiian Constitution.68  Moreover, 
the court held that the state is burdened with establishing that the 
prohibition of same-sex marriage can pass the “strict scrutiny” stand-
ard of review.69 
DOMA does two things that have had the effect of limiting 
the recognition of same-sex marriages to the states that elect to rec-
ognize same-sex marriage.  First, section 2 permits states, despite the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution,70 to refuse 
recognition of same-sex marriages legally entered into in other 
states.71  Secondly, section 3 of DOMA has the most detrimental ef-
fect on bi-national same-sex marriages as it provides that: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or 
of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the vari-
ous administrative bureaus and agencies of the United 
States, the word “marriage” means only a legal union 
between one man and one woman as husband and 
wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of 
the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.72 
 
66 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of 
choice [of marriage] not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations.  Under our Consti-
tution, the freedom to marry or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individu-
al and cannot be infringed by the State.”). 
67 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). 
68 See id. at 67 (discussing how the voters of Hawaii voted in favor of allowing the Ha-
waiian State Legislature to amend the Constitution to define marriage as only between a man 
and a woman); see also Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d  at 377 n.9 (discussing that the Hawaiian con-
stitution was amended to allow same-sex marriage following the decision in Baehr). 
69 Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
70 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the pub-
lic Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.  And the Congress may by 
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be 
proved, and the Effect thereof.”). 
71 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (“No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian 
tribe, shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any 
other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the 
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, posses-
sion, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.”). 
72 1 U.S.C. § 7. 
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In 1996, when DOMA was enacted, it had minimal effect be-
cause no state recognized same-sex marriages.73  By 2011, six states 
and the District of Columbia had legalized same-sex marriage.74  Sec-
tion 3 denies same-sex couples that were legally married in one of 
these seven jurisdictions a myriad of federally based marriage bene-
fits that are available for similarly situated heterosexual couples.75  In 
fact, in 1997, the General Accounting Office conducted an investiga-
tion, which found that “at least 1,049 federal laws, including those re-
lated to entitlement programs, such as Social Security, health bene-
fits, and taxation,” are affected by DOMA.76  Beyond the restriction 
of pecuniary benefits, bi-national same-sex couples have to live with 
the horror of being separated from their life partner forever.  DOMA 
has had the effect of creating a per se rule that an American citizen 
cannot enjoy the federal benefit of petitioning for their same-sex 
spouse to enter the United States as an immediate relative.77 
IV.  DOMA VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS EMBODIED 
IN THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
Until recently, there have not been many judicial challenges 
to DOMA.  This is partially due to the fact that no one had standing 
to challenge it because no state recognized same-sex marriage.78  
However, section 3 of DOMA suffered its first loss when United 
 
73 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Fight for Marriage Rights, ‘She’s our Thurgood Marshal,’ 
NY TIMES, Mar. 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/28/us/maine-lawyer-credited-
in-fight-for-gay-marriage.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (stating that Massachusetts became 
the first state to legalize gay marriage in 2003). 
74 Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 377 n.9 (discussing that Iowa, New Hampshire, Connecticut, 
Vermont, Massachusetts, and the District of Columbia have legalized same-sex marriage); 
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (2) (McKinney 2011) (“No government treatment or legal sta-
tus, effect, right, benefit, privilege, protection or responsibility relating to marriage, whether 
deriving from statute, administrative or court rule, public policy, common law or any other 
source of law, shall differ based on the parties to the marriage being or having been of the 
same sex rather than a different sex.”). 
75 See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“This 
case arises from Plaintiff’s constitutional challenge to section 3 of the Defense of Marriage 
Act (“DOMA”), the operation of which required Plaintiff to pay federal estate tax on her 
same-sex spouse’s estate, a tax from which similarly situated heterosexual couples are ex-
empt.”), aff’d, 699 F. 3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012). 
76 Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 379. 
77 Id. at 395-96. 
78 See, e.g., Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 685-86 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge DOMA because their same-sex mar-
riage was not recognized by any state). 
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States District Court judge, Joseph L. Tauro,79 held in Gill v. Office of 
Personnel Management80 that DOMA violated “the equal protection 
principles embodied in the Fifth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.”81  Judge Tauro opined that a fundamental principle of 
the Constitution is that it does not recognize or promote classes 
among citizens, and it is because of this commitment to the neutral 
application of law “that legislative provisions which arbitrarily or ir-
rationally create discrete classes cannot withstand constitutional scru-
tiny.”82 
Judge Tauro analyzed the interests cited by Congress when 
DOMA was enacted and the current interest the Department of Jus-
tice proffered during litigation.83  He applied the most deferential 
standard of review, “rational basis scrutiny,”84 and found that no ra-
tional relationship existed between DOMA and a legitimate govern-
mental interest.85 
V.  DOMA’S ASSERTED OBJECTIVES AT THE TIME OF 
ENACTMENT 
In 1996, Congress cited the following as the interests it sought 
to advance through the enactment of DOMA: “(1) encouraging re-
sponsible procreation and child-bearing, (2) defending and nurturing 
the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage, (3) defending tra-
ditional notions of morality, and (4) preserving scarce resources.”86  
Even the government distanced itself from this absurd reasoning pre-
 
79 Boston: Judge Information: Tauro, Joseph L., UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, 
http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/boston/tauro.htm (last visited May 2, 2013) (describing Judge 
Tauro as follows: “[He] has served as a Judge of the United States District Court since 1972.  
He was elevated to the position of Chief Judge in January 1992 and served in that capacity 
until January 1999.  His public service prior to being appointed to the bench included that as 
United States Attorney for Massachusetts, Chief Legal Counsel to the Governor of Massa-
chusetts, and two years in the Army as a Nike Guided Missile Officer”). 
80 699 F. Supp. 2d 374. 
81 Id. at 397; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
82 Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 386 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996)). 
83 Id. at 388, 390. 
84 See id. at 386-87 (reasoning that if a law does not “burden a fundamental right or target 
a suspect class” it is to be examined under rational basis scrutiny where it will be upheld un-
less the challenging party can establish that the law “bears [no] rational relationship to a le-
gitimate governmental interest”). 
85 Id. at 387. 
86 Id. at 388. 
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viously asserted by Congress.87  Nonetheless, Judge Tauro found it 
necessary to invalidate all four interests cited above.88 
With regard to the first interest, Judge Tauro stated that deny-
ing same-sex marriages recognition “does nothing to promote stabil-
ity in heterosexual parenting.”89  DOMA only prevents children of 
same-sex couples from benefiting from the numerous advantages that 
flow from having married parents who are able to enjoy benefits 
available under federal law.90  Moreover, “the ability to procreate is 
not now, nor has it ever been, a precondition to marriage in any state 
in the country.  Indeed, ‘the sterile and the elderly’ have never been 
denied the right to marry . . . .”91 
The second interest was just as indefensible as the first.  Judge 
Tauro stated that “Congress’ asserted interest in defending and nur-
turing heterosexual marriage is not ‘grounded in sufficient factual 
context [for this court] to ascertain some relation’ between it and the 
classification DOMA effects.”92  Unless there is substantial evidence 
that the denial of benefits will dramatically increase the likelihood 
that a homosexual will choose to marry a person of the opposite sex, 
it is completely irrational to believe that denying benefits to same-sex 
couples, who are legally married under state law, will defend and 
nurture heterosexual marriage.93  Moreover, the concept of “equal 
protection of the laws” does not permit Congress to promote one 
group at the expense of a politically unpopular group.94 
The third interest asserted by Congress is “defending tradi-
tional notions of morality.”  A remedial review of United States Su-
preme Court jurisprudence over the past thirty years would reveal 
that the Court’s “obligation is to define liberty of all, not to mandate 
our own moral code.”95  The fourth interest asserted, preservation of 
 
87 Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (“For purposes of this litigation, the government has disa-
vowed Congress’s stated justifications for the statute . . . .”). 
88 See id. at 390 (“[T]he rationales asserted by Congress in support of the enactment of 
DOMA are either improper or without relation to DOMA’s operation . . . .”). 
89 Id. at 389. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
92 Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 388 (alteration in original) (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 632-
33). 
93 Id. at 389. 
94 Id. 
95 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 
(1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 216 
(1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State has tradi-
12
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scarce government resources, appears to be a legitimate purpose on 
the surface.  However, “financial considerations did not motivate the 
law[,] . . . [and] the House [of Representatives] rejected a proposed 
amendment to DOMA that would have required a budgetary analy-
sis . . . .”96  Additionally, “the Congressional Budget Office conclud-
ed in 2004 that federal recognition of same-sex marriages by all fifty 
states would . . . result in a net increase in federal revenue.”97 
VI.  CURRENT REASONS ASSERTED IN DEFENSE OF DOMA 
In Gill, the court elected to cite interests in defense of DOMA 
that were different from the interests originally asserted by Congress 
when DOMA was enacted.  The court’s first reason was that “DOMA 
was necessary to ensure consistency in the distribution of federal 
marriage-based benefits.”98  It was important to the court to preserve 
the “status quo” and not interfere with the “pending . . . resolution of 
a socially contentious debate taking place in the states over whether 
to sanction same-sex marriage.”99  The second reason asserted is that 
federal agencies could not deal with the administrative burden of ad-
justing to the “changing patchwork of state approaches to same-sex 
marriage[s].”100 
Judge Tauro held that the “status quo” reasoning does not 
survive rational basis scrutiny.101  Domestic Relations Law, which es-
tablishes marriage eligibility requirements, has been the “exclusive 
province of the states.”102  Furthermore, “[m]arital eligibility for het-
erosexual couples has varied from state to state throughout the course 
of history . . . [and] individual states have changed their marital eligi-
bility requirements in a myriad [of] ways over time.”103  Yet, when it 
comes to heterosexual marriages, the federal government has not had 
trouble dealing with the differing marriage laws amongst the states.104 
 
tionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law 
prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegena-
tion from constitutional attack.”); Romer, 517 U.S. 620. 
96 Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 390 n.116. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 390. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. at 395 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
101 Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 390. 
102 Id. at 391. 
103 Id. 
104 See id. (noting that the federal government has had little trouble “embrac[ing] [the] 
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Furthermore, federal administrative agencies do not bear a 
greater burden simply because some married “couples are of the same 
sex.”105  Regardless of whether a couple is heterosexual or homosex-
ual, the marriage license is issued by the state.106  Conversely, 
DOMA adds complexity to the administrative task “by sundering the 
class of state-sanctioned marriages into two, those that are valid for 
federal purposes and those that are not.”107  These facts led Judge 
Tauro to the logical conclusion that “DOMA does not provide for na-
tionwide consistency in the distribution of federal benefits among 
married couples.”108  “Rather it denies to same-sex married couples 
the federal marriage-based benefits that similarly situated heterosex-
ual couples enjoy.”109 
VII.  DOMA IS AN INFRINGEMENT ON STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
In the companion case, Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health 
and Human Services,110 Judge Tauro granted the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts’s motion for summary judgment, holding that section 
3 of DOMA “encroaches upon the firmly entrenched province of the 
state, and, in doing so, offends the Tenth Amendment.”111  In this liti-
gation, Massachusetts contended that DOMA violated the “Tenth 
Amendment of the Constitution, by intruding on areas of exclusive 
state authority, as well as the Spending Clause, by forcing the Com-
monwealth to engage in invidious discrimination against its own citi-
zens in order to receive and retain federal funds in connection 
with . . . federal-state programs.”112 
In opposition, the government insisted that Congress had au-
thority under the “Spending Clause to determine how money is best 
spent to promote the ‘general welfare’ of the public.”113  In South 
 
variations and inconsistencies in state marriage laws” for heterosexuals). 
105 Id. at 395. 
106 Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d at 395. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 394. 
109 Id. 
110 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 2010). 
111 Id. at 253; U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people.”). 
112 Health and Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d at 236. 
113 Id. at 247. 
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Dakota v. Dole,114 the United States Supreme Court held that when 
Congress exercises its Spending Clause authority, the following re-
quirements must be satisfied: (1) the legislation “must be in pursuit of 
‘the general welfare;’ ” (2) any condition that is made applicable to 
the states for the receipt of federal funds must be unambiguous 
enough for “the [s]tates to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant 
of the consequences of their participation;” (3) the conditions cannot 
be “unrelated ‘to the federal interest in  particular national projects or 
programs;’ ” and (4) the legislation cannot be constitutionally im-
permissible.115  Judge Tauro found, based on the same reasoning uti-
lized in Gill, that “DOMA imposes an unconstitutional condition on 
the receipt of federal funding,” in violation of the fourth requirement 
stated above.116 
VIII.  CURRENT IMPACT OF DOMA ON BI-NATIONAL SAME-SEX 
COUPLES 
The Department of Justice initially filed appeals to Judge 
Tauro’s decisions in Gill to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit.117  However, on February 23, 2011, Attorney Gen-
eral Eric Holder, Jr., announced in a letter to Congress that “[a]fter 
careful consideration, including review of a recommendation from 
me, [President Barack Obama] has made the determination that Sec-
tion 3 of [DOMA], as applied to same-sex couples who are legally 
married under state law, violates the equal protection component of 
the Fifth Amendment.”118 
Attorney General Holder further stated that “the President has 
instructed the Department [of Justice] not to defend [DOMA],” but 
“the President has informed me that Section 3 will continue to be en-
 
114 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
115 Id. at 207-08 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937)) (quoting Pennhurst 
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); Massachusetts v. U.S., 435 U.S. 
444, 461 (1978)). 
116 Health and Human Servs., 698 F.Supp.2d at 249. 
117 Chris Geidner, DOJ Files DOMA Defense in First Circuit Cases, METRO WEEKLY 
(Jan. 13, 2011, 7:01 PM), http://metroweekly.com/poliglot/2011/01/doj-files-doma-defense-
in-firs.html (“Although each is slightly different, these three “rationales” do read like differ-
ent shades of the same argument, which is more or less that DOMA made sense—or, is ra-
tional—because the states hadn’t reached a uniform decision.”). 
118 Letter from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., to John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-
ag-223.html. 
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forced by the Executive Branch.”119  In essence, this proclamation by 
the Attorney General stopped, by executive order, the Department of 
Justice from raising a defense in suits where DOMA is challenged.  
This was a major victory for those who oppose DOMA.  However, in 
reaction to the Attorney General’s letter, on April 18, 2011, led by 
Speaker of the House, Representative John Boehner, the House of 
Representatives Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group120 announced that 
it would be hiring a law firm to defend challenges to DOMA.121 
The conflict between the official positions of the House of 
Representatives and the Executive Branch, combined with the current 
judicial challenges to DOMA have had the effect of leaving bi-
national same-sex couples in limbo.
 122  The Director of Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), John Morton, issued a memoran-
dum instructing immigration officials to focus their “removal”123 ef-
forts on undocumented immigrants who are criminals, gang mem-
bers, or security threats.124  Additionally, he advised officials to 
exercise “prosecutorial discretion” favoring undocumented immi-
 
119 Id. 
120 RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS 
(2013), Rule II, cl. 8, available at http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf (last vis-
ited May 2, 2013). 
There is established an Office of General Counsel for the purpose of 
providing legal assistance and representation to the House.  Legal assis-
tance and representation shall be provided without regard to political af-
filiation.  The Office of General Counsel shall function pursuant to the 
direction of the Speaker, who shall consult with a Bipartisan Legal Advi-
sory Group, which shall include the majority and minority leaderships.  
The Speaker shall appoint and set the annual rate of pay for employees 
of the Office of General Counsel. 
Id. 
121 Chris Geidner, Speaker Boehner’s DOMA Defense Lawyer, Paul Clement, is An-
nounced and Faces Questions, METRO WEEKLY, Apr. 18, 2011, 11:02 PM, 
http://www.metroweekly.com/poliglot/2011/04/paul-clements-defense-pro-and.html (“Word 
then came that former Solicitor General Paul Clement—the top appellate litigator during part 
of the George W. Bush administration—will be serving as the outside counsel to the House 
BLAG in its DOMA defense . . . .”). 
122 See, e.g., Gill, 699 F. Supp. 2d 374; Health and Human Servs., 698 F.Supp. 2d 234; 
Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 3:2010cv01750 (D. Conn. filed Nov. 09, 2010); 
Windsor v. U.S., No. 1:2010cv08435 (S.D.N.Y. filed Nov. 09, 2010). 
123 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2011) (“Any alien . . . in and admitted to the United States shall, 
upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is within one or more of 
the . . . classes of deportable aliens.”). 
124 John Morton, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigra-
tion Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of 
Alien, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Jun. 17, 2011), 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf. 
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grants who have a “spouse, child, or parent” who is a United States 
citizen or who is the “primary caretaker” for one who is disabled or 
ill.125 
Though Director Morton’s memo does not explicitly mention 
bi-national same-sex couples, it does create an environment where 
enforcement of DOMA is not compulsory upon immigration offi-
cials; however, the fates of bi-national same-sex couples are left to 
the subjective attitudes of various immigration officials.126  Further-
more, non-citizen same-sex spouses of United States citizens still will 
not be granted the legal status typically afforded to immigrants who 
have heterosexual spouses.127  Thus, until the DOMA issue is re-
solved, bi-national same-sex couples will not enjoy the same rights as 
similarly situated bi-national heterosexual couples. 
IX.  UNITING AMERICAN FAMILIES ACT 
It is painfully apparent that DOMA is a contentious issue and 
the uncertainty surrounding its validity will likely be resolved in the 
near future.128  In the meantime, many bi-national same-sex couples 
will have to live with the anxiety that is born from the fear that their 
family may be permanently severed one day because the non-citizen 
partner cannot gain legal status.  However, a solution may be on the 
horizon.  The Uniting American Families Act (“UAFA”) is intended 
 
125 Id. 
When weighing whether an exercise of prosecutorial discretion may be 
warranted for a given alien, ICE officers, agents, and attorneys should 
consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to . . . whether the 
person has a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, child, or parent[; 
and] whether the person is the primary caretaker of a person with a men-
tal or physical disability, minor, or seriously ill relative . . . . 
Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Compare Mallory Simon, Same-Sex Couples Fight for Immigration Rights, 
CNNPOLITICS.COM (Jun. 3, 2009, 11:16 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/06/03/ 
same.sex.immigration/index.html?_s=PM:POLITICS (discussing how federal immigration 
laws do not allow United States citizens to “sponsor their foreign-born same-sex partners for 
citizenship as a man may do for his wife or a woman for her husband”), with Morton, supra 
note 124. 
128 On Wednesday, March 27, 2013, the United States Supreme Court heard oral argu-
ments challenging the key section of DOMA that prohibits the federal government from rec-
ognizing same-sex marriages in the case of United States v. Windsor, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 
2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (No. 12-307).  Audio highlights from DOMA oral 
argument, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 30, 2013, 11:21 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=161937. 
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to remedy this issue by amending the INA to include “permanent 
partners.”129 
The UAFA defines “permanent partner” as: 
[A]n individual 18 years of age or older who—”(A) is 
in a committed, intimate relationship with another in-
dividual 18 years of age or older in which both parties 
intend a lifelong commitment; “(B) is financially in-
terdependent with that other individual; “(C) is not 
married to or in a permanent partnership with anyone 
other than that other individual; “(D) is unable to con-
tract with that other individual a marriage cognizable 
under this Act; and “(E) is not a first, second, or third 
degree blood relation of that other individual.”130 
The proposed legislation is not intended to alter DOMA and 
how it functions.131  The federal benefits afforded to legally married 
heterosexuals are not extended to same-sex couples under the 
UAFA.132  Instead, it is intended to operate within the confines of 
DOMA by including permanent partners to the list of immigrants that 
a U.S. citizen can file a petition for as an immediate relative.133 
As expected, there are many who oppose this amendment to 
the INA for a variety of reasons.  The chairman of the Catholic Bish-
ops’ Committee of Migration, Bishop John C. Wester, stated that the 
Act “would ‘erode the institution of marriage and family’ by taking a 
position ‘that is contrary to the very nature of marriage which pre-
dates the Church and the State.’ ”134  Additionally, in testimony be-
fore the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Executive Director of 
NumbersUSA, Roy Beck, testified that the UAFA and other legisla-
 
129 H.R. 1537, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011) (describing a bill proposed by Representative Jer-
rold Nadler of New York, which amends the Immigration and Nationality Act to accommo-
date same-sex partners.); see also S. 424, 111th Cong. (2009). 
130 H.R. 1537, 112th Cong. § 2 (2011). 
131 Golden, supra note 47, at 319. 
132 Letter from Caroline Fredrickson, Dir. of the Washington Legislative Office of the 
Am. Civil Liberties Union, to the United States Senate (Jun. 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/files/images/asset_upload_file966_39743.pdf. 
133 Id. (“If enacted, UAFA would require bi-national same-sex couples to meet the same 
standards as opposite-sex couples.  For example, same-sex couples would be required to 
produce evidence of their relationship, such as affidavits from friends or family, and evi-
dence of financial interdependence.”). 
134 Julia Preston, Bill Proposes Immigration Rights for Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 2, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/03/us/politics/03immig.html?_r=1. 
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tion that will potentially increase the number of green cards issued 
will have a negative impact because “every new adult permanently 
added to the U.S. population through immigration legislation would 
be a potential competitor to unemployed and underemployed Ameri-
can workers.  And every new immigrant increases the total U.S. car-
bon footprint and ecological footprint . . . .”135  Others argue that that 
the UAFA will result in an increase in visa fraud.136 
The argument that this Act will “erode the institution of mar-
riage and family” is unfounded.  Nuclear families are not the only 
families entitled to constitutional recognition.137  An essential princi-
ple of the United States immigration policy is preserving family uni-
ty.  “Yet gay and lesbian Americans are still forced to choose be-
tween their country and being with those they love.  This destructive 
policy tears families apart and forces hardworking Americans to 
make the heart-wrenching choice to leave the country . . . .”138  The 
impact of the separation of bi-national same-sex couples does not on-
ly affect the individuals involved in the relationship but will also af-
fect the adopted children of these couples who will surely suffer tre-
mendous emotional harm resulting from the forced severance of their 
families.139 
There may or may not be rational arguments that increases in 
immigration have the potential to strain the resources of the United 
States.  However, these arguments do not defeat the overwhelming 
goal of family reunification already built into the INA.  When Presi-
dent George H.W. Bush signed the Immigration Act of 1990140 into 
law, he stated that “the law ‘maintains our Nation’s historic commit-
ment to family reunification by increasing the number of immigrant 
 
135 No New Categories of Immigration Should be Considered Until Overall Green Card 
Numbers Are Dramatically Reduced: Hearings on S. 424 Before the U.S. Senate Judiciary 
Committee, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Roy Beck, Executive Director of 
NumbersUSA), available at http://www.numbersusa.com/content/nusablog/beckr/june-2-
2009/my-testimony-today-senate-judiciary-committee-asks-decisions-be-made-nati. 
136 Congressional Documents, supra note 12 (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy of Ver-
mont when re-introducing the UAFA). 
137 See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977). 
138 Congressional Documents, supra note 12 (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy of Ver-
mont when re-introducing the UAFA). 
139 Elizabeth Ricci, Will Binational Same-Sex Couples Get Justice?, GAY AND LESBIAN 
REV., Jul. 1, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 14289846. 
140 Immigration Act 1990, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgn
extoid=84ff95c4f635f010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=b328194d3e88
d010VgnVCM10000048f3d6a1RCRD (last visited May 2, 2013). 
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visas allocated on the basis of family ties.’ ”141 
Moreover, Congress’s intent to maintain family unity is ap-
parent.  The INA permits “children, spouses and parents” of United 
States citizens to gain immediate legal permanent residency.142  It al-
so permits adult children of United States citizens and brothers and 
sisters of United States citizens to enter the United States “subject to 
the worldwide level . . . [of] family-sponsored immigrants.”143  It is 
clear that unifying families has and continues to take precedence over 
economic concerns.  In addition, the argument that there will be an 
increase in visa fraud if the UAFA is enacted does not prevail.  A 
permanent partner will be subject both to the same scrutiny as a part-
ner in a heterosexual marriage and to the same marriage fraud penal-
ties.144 
The UAFA does not grant immediate relief for bi-national 
same-sex couples from all of the ills of DOMA.  It is an imperfect so-
lution that arguably promotes the notion that gays and lesbians are to 
be treated as second-class citizens, and that their marriages should 
not be recognized as real marriages.  At the same time, it does create 
an avenue for the families of bi-national same-sex couples to remain 
intact until the nation advances enough to repeal DOMA, legislative-
ly or judicially. 
X.  CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that bi-national same-sex couples are not afford-
ed the same rights as similarly situated heterosexual couples.  How-
ever, since Adams was decided in 1982, stronger arguments have de-
veloped that bi-national same-sex marriages should be recognized for 
immigration purposes.  First, the ambiguity regarding the exclusion 
of homosexuals as part of the “sexual deviancy” exclusion was elimi-
nated by the Immigration Reform Act of 1990.  This invalidated the 
court’s rationale in Adams that since homosexuals are excludable 
they cannot be considered “spouses” for immigration purposes. 
Second, there are now states in the union that recognize same-
 
141 Matthew J. Hrutkay, Note, “Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Huddled Masses,” 
But Not Your Homosexual Partners: International Solutions to America’s Same-Sex Immi-
gration Dilemma, 18 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 89, 98 (2010) (citation omitted). 
142 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). 
143 8 U.S.C. § 1153. 
144 Congressional Documents, supra note 12 (statement of Senator Patrick Leahy of Ver-
mont when re-introducing the UAFA). 
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sex marriages.  This invalidates the other portion of the rationale in 
Adams that gave recognition to the common usage of the word 
spouse.  The recognition of same-sex marriage in some states has had 
the effect of including same-sex couples in the definition of spouse, 
which is simply defined as a married person.145 
Though the Ninth Circuit’s rationale in Adams has been inval-
idated, United States citizens still do not have the right to petition for 
their same-sex partners to enter the United States as an immediate 
relative.  This is mainly due to section 3 of DOMA, which mandates 
that the federal government must grant recognition to heterosexual 
marriages and must deny federal marriage benefits to same-sex cou-
ples.  At the same time, Judge Tauro’s decisions in Gill declared 
DOMA unconstitutional because it violates the equal protection com-
ponent of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, and in-
fringes on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment.146  
Additionally, the Obama administration announced that it has found 
DOMA to be unconstitutional, and the Department of Justice an-
nounced that it will discontinue its current defense of section 3 of 
DOMA, and will not defend DOMA in future litigation.147 
The UAFA is a viable alternative for bi-national same-sex 
couples while the legality of DOMA is pending.  The UAFA is in-
tended to work within the limitations of DOMA.  Though the UAFA 
does not afford bi-national same-sex couples the same rights afforded 
to bi-national heterosexual couples, it does create an option that pre-
vents the devastating effect of forced severance of families.  Ulti-
mately, there is no reasonable basis for the denial of immigration 
benefits to bi-national same-sex couples.  Yet, legally married bi-
national same-sex couples are forced to live with the fear of having 
their families permanently separated.  It would be unthinkable for 
heterosexual couples to endure.  This harmful and unreasonable dis-
tinction between similarly situated people should be eliminated. 
 
 
145 MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/spouse (last 
visited May 2, 2013). 
146 Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 248, 253. 
147 Letter from Att’y Gen., Eric Holder, to Congress on Litigation Involving the Defense 
of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/ 
11-ag-223.html. 
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